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  1. 1. Short verdict
  2. 2. Overall metric table
  3. 3. Accuracy, PQ, and dominance
  4. 4. Loss metrics: Karpov slightly cleaner
  5. 5. Standard deviations and stability
  6. 6. Game Accuracy and Mutual Accuracy
  7. 7. Game-by-game metric edge
  8. 8. Phase-by-phase interpretation
    1. Games 1–9: Karpov builds the match
    2. Games 1–27: Karpov’s lead phase
    3. Games 28–48: Kasparov takes over
    4. Games 47–48: the collapse/reversal endpoint
  9. 9. Correlations with game score
  10. 10. Which metric families explain the 25–23 result?
    1. 1. Conversion explains most of the final margin
    2. 2. Expected Score and Dominance explain the underlying edge
    3. 3. Volatility explains Karpov’s stable advantage
    4. 4. RMS ES Loss is more favorable than raw accuracy counts
    5. 5. Error Concentration is almost irrelevant here
  11. 11. Chess interpretation
  12. 12. Final article-style thesis

I treated Anatoly Karpov as the main player and Garry Kasparov as the opponent, because that is how the uploaded run tables are structured. This package covers the single Karpov–Kasparov 1984 World-Championship match, so “match-by-match” and “overall” are numerically the same; I add phase-by-phase readings to make the long 48-game match interpretable.

1. Short verdict

The 1984 match is statistically almost equal, but with a small Karpov edge in the aggregate.

The most important result is this:

Karpov won the 48-game point score 25–23, but the engine-WDL expected score was only 24.187–23.813.

So Karpov’s actual margin was +2.000, but his expected-score margin was only +0.374. The rest came from conversion:

Actual score margin = Expected-score margin + Conversion swing
+2.000 = +0.374 + +1.626

That means the match was not decided by a large average engine-quality gap. It was decided by:

  1. Tiny Karpov average superiority
  2. Slightly lower Karpov volatility
  3. Slightly better Karpov loss profile
  4. Much better Karpov conversion over the full match
  5. A major phase reversal where Kasparov became better late

2. Overall metric table

MetricKarpovKasparovDifference / ratioBetter
Score25.00023.000+2.000 / 1.087×Karpov
Expected Score24.18723.813+0.374 / 1.016×Karpov
Conversion+0.813−0.813+1.626 differenceKarpov
WDL Accuracy98.63398.563+0.070 / 1.0007×Karpov
Performance Quality / PQ97.60197.580+0.021 / 1.0002×Karpov
Dominance+0.023−0.023+0.046 differenceKarpov
Mean ES Loss0.013670.01437Karpov 4.9% lowerKarpov
RMS ES Loss0.035460.03611Karpov 1.8% lowerKarpov
Error Concentration2.5832.589Karpov 0.2% lowerAlmost equal
WDL Volatility0.014410.01528Karpov 5.7% lowerKarpov
Total WDL Volatility23.98525.555Karpov 6.1% lowerKarpov
HardRAP2439.652248.66Karpov 1.085×Karpov
SoftRAP3562.243466.24Karpov 1.028×Karpov

The striking feature is how small most differences are. Karpov wins almost every aggregate category, but usually by microscopic margins.

The only large-looking edge is conversion: Karpov scored +0.813 above expected, while Kasparov scored −0.813 below expected. That conversion swing of +1.626 explains most of the final 25–23 point margin.


3. Accuracy, PQ, and dominance

MetricKarpovKasparovDifference
WDL Accuracy98.63398.563+0.070
PQ97.60197.580+0.021
Dominance+0.023−0.023+0.046

These are not domination numbers. They say:

Karpov was slightly better on average, but the match was nearly level in raw move-quality terms.

The dominance figure is especially small. A dominance difference of +0.046 over 48 games is much lower than Karpov’s clearer wins against Korchnoi in 1981, or Fischer’s run-wide dominance in 1971–72. This match was a long technical deadlock with a small early Karpov surplus.


4. Loss metrics: Karpov slightly cleaner

MetricKarpovKasparovRatio
Mean ES Loss0.013670.014370.951
RMS ES Loss0.035460.036110.982
Error Concentration2.5832.5890.998
WDL Volatility0.014410.015280.943

Karpov’s most meaningful non-score edges are:

  • Mean ES Loss: about 4.9% lower
  • WDL Volatility: about 5.7% lower
  • Total Volatility: about 6.1% lower

But RMS ES Loss and Error Concentration are almost equal. This means Karpov did not massively outperform Kasparov in large-error avoidance. Instead, he was marginally more stable and marginally less leaky.

In plain chess language:

Karpov’s aggregate edge was not “Kasparov blundered much more.”
It was “Karpov leaked slightly less expected score and kept the match slightly less volatile.”


5. Standard deviations and stability

Metric SDKarpovKasparovSD ratio
WDL Accuracy SD5.8136.2570.929
PQ SD2.4342.5660.949
Mean ES Loss SD0.05810.06260.929
RMS ES Loss SD0.03870.04150.933
Error Concentration SD1.0361.0101.025
WDL Volatility SD0.05810.06290.924
Total Volatility SD0.5950.6750.882
HardRAP SD19.47719.6710.990
SoftRAP SD9.87310.2100.967

Karpov was usually slightly more stable. His WDL Accuracy, PQ, Mean ES Loss, RMS ES Loss, Volatility, and Total Volatility SDs are all lower.

The one exception is Error Concentration SD, where Karpov is slightly higher: 1.036 vs 1.010. So Kasparov’s error concentration was marginally more stable, even though Karpov’s average error concentration was infinitesimally better.

The stability conclusion:

Karpov was the steadier player in most categories, but only slightly.
This was not a mismatch of consistency; it was a match of two extremely stable players.


6. Game Accuracy and Mutual Accuracy

The game-level aggregate values are:

Game-level metricMeanSDMinMax
Game Accuracy98.7801.28593.94799.888
Mutual Accuracy97.5892.51388.25999.776
Game Mean ES Loss0.012200.012850.001120.06058
Game RMS ES Loss0.036720.039600.003130.13545
Game Volatility0.013050.013170.001500.06204
Game Total Volatility1.0321.2670.07355.3975
Game Conversion Magnitude0.1190.2110.00060.7435

This is an extremely high-quality match by average Game Accuracy and Mutual Accuracy. But high game quality did not mean equal score production in every phase. The match had many near-perfect draws, then decisive moments where conversion and late-match fatigue/pressure mattered.


7. Game-by-game metric edge

Across the 48 games:

Metric familyKarpov betterKasparov better
WDL Accuracy2325
PQ2325
Dominance2325
Mean ES Loss2325
RMS ES Loss2721
Volatility2820

This is very revealing.

Kasparov actually has the better game-by-game count in raw accuracy, PQ, dominance, and mean loss: 25–23. But Karpov wins the overall match score and has the aggregate expected-score edge.

Why? Because Karpov’s good games were more score-effective earlier, while Kasparov’s late superiority reduced the margin but did not fully overturn it.

Karpov’s clearest game-count advantages are:

  • RMS ES Loss: 27–21
  • Volatility: 28–20

So if one wants a compact “Karpov edge” from the game-level table, it is not raw accuracy. It is:

fewer severe-loss profiles and lower volatility in more games.


8. Phase-by-phase interpretation

Because this is one long match, the phase split is more informative than the single-match aggregate.

Games 1–9: Karpov builds the match

MetricKarpovKasparov
Score6.52.5
Expected Score5.3723.628
Conversion+1.128−1.128
WDL Accuracy98.15497.681
PQ96.12695.665
Mean ES Loss0.018460.02319
RMS ES Loss0.056240.07209
Volatility0.019130.02391
Dominance+0.473−0.473

This was Karpov’s strongest phase. He had:

  • large score margin
  • large expected-score margin
  • strong conversion
  • lower mean loss
  • lower RMS loss
  • lower volatility
  • clear dominance

The early match explains much of the final result. Karpov’s final +2 margin survives because he built a large early lead.

Games 1–27: Karpov’s lead phase

MetricKarpovKasparov
Score16.011.0
Expected Score14.41512.585
Conversion+1.585
WDL Accuracy98.93798.827
PQ97.84397.737
Mean ES Loss0.010630.01173
RMS ES Loss0.032600.03488
Volatility0.011260.01237
Dominance+0.110

Through game 27, Karpov was clearly ahead both in score and expected score. The actual lead was +5, while expected score gave him about +1.83. Again, conversion was doing a lot of work.

Games 28–48: Kasparov takes over

MetricKarpovKasparov
Score9.012.0
Expected Score9.77211.228
Conversion−0.772
WDL Accuracy98.60398.692
PQ97.28997.378
Mean ES Loss0.013970.01308
RMS ES Loss0.039140.03770
Volatility0.014910.01444
Dominance−0.089

This is the reversal. From game 28 onward, Kasparov was better in:

  • score
  • expected score
  • accuracy
  • PQ
  • mean loss
  • RMS loss
  • volatility
  • dominance

So the overall match cannot be described simply as “Karpov outplayed Kasparov.” More accurately:

Karpov outplayed Kasparov early and converted heavily; Kasparov outplayed Karpov late but did not quite erase the earlier deficit.

Games 47–48: the collapse/reversal endpoint

MetricKarpovKasparov
Score0.02.0
Expected Score0.4411.559
Conversion−0.441
WDL Accuracy97.83099.065
PQ96.31097.527
Mean ES Loss0.021710.00935
RMS ES Loss0.076350.03703
Volatility0.023650.01087
Dominance−1.236

The final two games are dramatically Kasparov-favored. Karpov’s RMS ES Loss was more than double Kasparov’s, and his volatility was also more than double. These final games are a strong statistical signal of late-match deterioration from Karpov or late-match surge from Kasparov.


9. Correlations with game score

The strongest game-level correlations with Karpov’s score were:

PredictorCorrelation with Karpov game score
Karpov Conversion0.897
Karpov Expected Score0.877
Dominance difference0.743
Accuracy difference0.743
Mean ES Loss advantage0.743
PQ difference0.742
Volatility advantage0.671
RMS ES Loss advantage0.569
Game Accuracy−0.096
Mutual Accuracy−0.097

This says the match result was explained most directly by expected score and conversion, then by the relative edge metrics.

As in your previous reports, Game Accuracy and Mutual Accuracy by themselves do not explain the score. A very accurate game can be a draw. What matters for scoring is not absolute cleanliness but relative advantage.


10. Which metric families explain the 25–23 result?

1. Conversion explains most of the final margin

Karpov’s final margin was +2.000, but his expected-score margin was only +0.374.

So the conversion swing was:

+1.626

That means about 81% of the final score margin comes from conversion beyond expected score.

This makes conversion the most important score-explanation family.

2. Expected Score and Dominance explain the underlying edge

Karpov’s expected-score margin was only:

24.187–23.813

Dominance was also tiny:

+0.023 vs −0.023

So the underlying engine-WDL edge existed, but barely. It was not enough to describe the match as a clear technical victory.

3. Volatility explains Karpov’s stable advantage

Karpov’s WDL Volatility was:

0.01441 vs 0.01528

That is a modest but meaningful advantage: Karpov was about 5.7% less volatile. Total volatility also favored him by 1.570 points.

This is one of the more “Karpovian” results in the table: even in a near-equal match, he was slightly better at suppressing swings.

4. RMS ES Loss is more favorable than raw accuracy counts

Karpov lost the game-count comparison in raw accuracy 23–25, but won RMS ES Loss 27–21. This suggests that even when Kasparov was often a little cleaner game-by-game, Karpov more often avoided the worse large-error profile.

5. Error Concentration is almost irrelevant here

Error Concentration:

Karpov 2.583 vs Kasparov 2.589

This is essentially equal. It is not a major explanation of the match.


11. Chess interpretation

The match’s statistical personality is very distinctive:

1984 is not a simple Karpov superiority match. It is a two-phase match: Karpov’s early technical and conversion lead versus Kasparov’s late recovery and eventual statistical takeover.

Karpov’s full-match advantages are real but tiny:

  • +0.070 WDL Accuracy
  • +0.021 PQ
  • +0.046 dominance difference
  • 4.9% lower Mean ES Loss
  • 5.7% lower volatility
  • +0.813 conversion

Kasparov’s countercase is also strong:

  • He was better in more individual games by raw accuracy/PQ/dominance.
  • From game 28 onward, he was better in nearly every key family.
  • The final two games were strongly Kasparov-favored.
  • The match’s aggregate expected-score gap was only +0.374 for Karpov.

So the best final reading is:

Karpov won the numerical 48-game score because his early superiority and conversion were large enough to survive Kasparov’s late surge.
But the underlying engine-WDL quality gap was tiny, and the late-match trend points strongly toward Kasparov’s adaptation.


12. Final article-style thesis

A compact thesis for this article part could be:

Karpov–Kasparov 1984 was a match of early Karpov conversion versus late Kasparov adaptation.
Over the full 48 games, Karpov held a tiny aggregate edge in WDL Accuracy, PQ, expected score, volatility, and RAP. But the edge was narrow: the expected-score margin was only 24.187–23.813, while most of the final 25–23 score came from conversion.
The phase split is decisive: Karpov dominated the early match, but Kasparov was the stronger player from roughly game 28 onward, and especially in the final two games. Thus, the match’s statistics support both truths at once: Karpov was still ahead overall, but Kasparov was already overtaking him by the end.